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THE SUPREME COURT AND RECUSALS:   
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LUBET 
Laurel A. Rigertas* 
I would like to thank Valparaiso University Law School for the 
opportunity to participate in its scholarly roundtable discussion 
following Steven Lubet’s lecture at the annual Tabor Institute on Legal 
Ethics lecture series.  This essay is in response to Professor Lubet’s 
lecture and his corresponding article, Stonewalling, Leaks and Counter-
Leaks:  SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, which addresses 
the Supreme Court’s failure to adopt a code of conduct.1  While this is a 
broad topic that covers many areas, such as confidentiality, public 
speaking, and the acceptance of gifts, this essay focuses on the area that 
Lubet addressed—recusals.  Lubet argues that the Supreme Court 
should adopt a comprehensive code of conduct that would, among other 
areas, address recusals.  In particular, Lubet argues that the full Supreme 
Court should review an individual Justice’s decision regarding recusal. 
I agree with two main points that Lubet makes in his article.  First, 
the Supreme Court’s rationale for not adopting a code of conduct—as 
recently set out by Chief Justice Roberts—is unpersuasive.2  Second, the 
current recusal practice—where each Justice decides on his or her own 
behalf whether recusal is warranted without explanation or review—
makes it difficult for the public to understand recusal decisions and to 
know what to expect from the Justices in future cases.3  In short, the 
current practice lacks standards, transparency, and accountability.4  
Lubet’s proposal that the full Supreme Court review recusal decisions 
would address some of these issues, but it raises some concerns about 
the public’s perception of the institution, which this essay explores 
briefly. 
As Lubet points out, the Supreme Court is the only court in the 
United States that has not adopted a code of conduct.5  In the past couple 
of years this aberration has received some public scrutiny, which 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. 
1 Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks:  SCOTUS Ethics in 
the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883 (2013). 
2 Id. at 888. 
3 Id. at 890–91. 
4 See James J. Alfini, Supreme Court Ethics:  The Need for Greater Transparency and 
Accountability, 21 PROF. LAW. 10, 10–13 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s need for 
greater transparency and accountability, particularly in the area of recusals); Sherrilyn A. 
Ifill, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 336 (2012) (noting how 
the Supreme Court’s lack of transparency makes it difficult for litigants and the public to 
understand the Court’s decisions). 
5 Lubet, supra note 1, at 886–87. 
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resulted in academics and members of Congress making some efforts, 
albeit unsuccessful ones, to correct this deficiency.6  No action was ever 
taken on the Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011 
(HR 682), which proposed reforms.  Chief Justice Roberts addressed 
these efforts in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary.7  In that 
report, Roberts set forth his justifications for the Supreme Court’s 
decision not to adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct that has been adopted 
by the Judicial Conference of the United States and applies to every other 
federal judge in the United States.8  Roberts reasoned, in short, that there 
were other sources that could guide the Justices, that a code could not 
answer all ethical questions (particularly those unique to the Supreme 
Court), and that “no compilation of ethical rules can guarantee 
integrity.”9 
Lubet’s article persuasively explains why each of those observations, 
while accurate enough, does not justify the Supreme Court’s choice to 
operate without a code of conduct.10  Are there other reasons unstated by 
Roberts that explain the Court’s resistance to enacting a code of conduct?  
Perhaps the real reason for the reluctance to adopt a code of conduct is 
that it would lead logically to the question of how it would be enforced, 
a question that the Justices do not want to answer.11  The Supreme Court 
has a long tradition of preserving not only its independence as an 
institution, but the independence of each Justice’s decisions.12  Adopting 
                                                 
6 Id. at 887.  Over 100 law professors wrote to Congress asking it to enact legislation that 
would require the Supreme Court to follow the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct, 
which applies to all other federal judges.  Id.  Following this letter, the Supreme Court 
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011 (HR 862) was introduced, which would have 
required the Supreme Court to follow the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct.  Id.  
Neither of these efforts yielded any results.  Id. 
7 Lubet, supra note 1, at 887–88; see also CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf. 
8 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 3–5. 
9 Id. at 4–5, 11. 
10 Lubet, supra note 1, at 888–91. 
11 A letter from over 100 law professors to congressional committees urged the adoption 
of a code of conduct for the Supreme Court and further urged the establishment of “a set of 
procedures to enforce the Code’s standards as applied to Supreme Court justices.”  Letter 
from 138 Law Professors to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. 1, 3 (Mar. 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf. (emphasis added).  As 
Lubet writes, the Justices “appear to regard with near horror” the idea that they have been 
held accountable for noncompliance with standards.  Lubet, supra note 1, at 890. 
12 See Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, An Independent Judiciary:  
In Honor of the Sesquicentennial Anniversary of the Massachusetts Superior Court (Sept. 22, 
2009), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename 
=sp_09-22-09.html.  In a 2009 speech that Justice Breyer gave regarding judicial 
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a process to review an individual Justice’s recusal decision would be 
antithetical to this tradition.  That concern may be the real reason the 
Supreme Court has not enacted a code of conduct. 
Roberts’s Year-End Report provides some support for this theory.  
The Report correctly notes that the Code of Conduct, as adopted by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, applies only to lower federal 
court judges:   
That reflects a fundamental difference between the 
Supreme Court and the other federal courts.  Article III 
of the Constitution creates only one court, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, but it empowers Congress to 
establish additional lower federal courts that the 
Framers knew the country would need.  Congress 
instituted the Judicial Conference for the benefit of the 
courts it had created.  Because the Judicial Conference is 
an instrument for the management of the lower federal 
courts, its committees have no mandate to prescribe 
rules or standards for any other body.13 
Roberts then goes on to assert that the Members of the Court do refer to 
the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct.  They are guided by it, 
however, in the same spirit as the first code of conduct that was drafted 
for judges—the 1924 Canons of Judicial Conduct.14  As Roberts points out, 
“The 1924 Canons were advisory.”15  In other words, they were not 
enforceable standards.  If the Justices are only guided by advisory 
sources and not bound by a definitive code, then the problems of 
accountability and enforcement do not need to be addressed. 
The enforcement problem is a particularly troublesome one for the 
Supreme Court in the area of recusals.  As Roberts points out, “There is 
no higher court to review a Justice’s decision not to recuse in a particular 
case . . . . [T]he Supreme Court does not sit in judgment of one of its own 
Members’ decision whether to recuse in the course of deciding a case.”16  
So if a code of conduct was adopted and addressed recusals, who would 
review a Justice’s decision regarding recusal?   
                                                                                                             
independence, he used the concepts of the independence of the judiciary and the 
independence of judges interchangeably.  Id. 
13 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Id. at 2.  Later Roberts states that “the Code remains the starting point and key source 
of guidance for the Justices as well as their lower court colleagues.”  Id. at 5. 
16 Id. at 8–9. 
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Under current practice, a motion for recusal is referred to the Justice 
to whom the motion is directed.  That Justice then makes his or her own 
decision about whether recusal is warranted.17  When making this 
decision, the Justices are guided by Title 28, Section 455 of the United 
States Code, which states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of 
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”18  The Justices rarely 
explain their reasons for granting or denying a motion for recusal.19  The 
Justices’ decisions are not reviewed and, therefore, can never be 
reversed.20  As Roberts’s Report concludes, “I have complete confidence 
in the capability of my colleagues to determine when recusal is 
warranted. . . . We are all deeply committed to the common interest in 
preserving the Court’s vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the 
rule of law.”21  The issue is not, however, whether the Justices are 
committed to the institution; the issue is that the current system has 
three deficiencies that are inconsistent with the role and stature of the 
Supreme Court:  it lacks clear standards, transparency, and 
accountability.22 
I.  STANDARDS 
With respect to standards for recusal, the Justices follow 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455, which requires recusal when a Justice’s impartiality may be 
reasonably questioned.  A code of conduct could help further elaborate 
on those standards.23  What is missing from the Supreme Court, 
however, is a body of precedent that further develops and interprets the 
standards that Justices should apply when making recusal decisions.  As 
stated before, it is rare for a Justice to provide a written decision that 
explains his or her reasoning regarding recusal.  Indeed, as explained in 
Lubet’s article, some Justices actually seem to feel that it would 
                                                 
17 Id. at 8; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 
680–81 (2005) (discussing the Court’s 1993 recusal policy); Lubet, supra note 1, at 894–99. 
18 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 8; see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b) (2006) (providing the codification 
for when any Justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall disqualify himself).  Section 455(b) 
also gives several specific circumstances warranting recusal, such as having personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding that would warrant 
disqualification.  Id. 
19 Lubet, supra note 1, at 891–94. 
20 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
21 Id. at 10. 
22 See Alfini, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing the Supreme Court’s need for greater 
transparency and accountability, particularly in the area of recusals). 
23 For example, the Code of Conduct adopted by the Judicial Conference could provide 
standards for the Supreme Court. 
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somehow be inappropriate to share their reasoning with their 
colleagues.24  The lack of written decisions, however, is inconsistent with 
the role of the Supreme Court, which is in large part to provide 
precedent that will promote uniformity in future decisions. 
II.  TRANSPARENCY 
The current recusal procedures, and in particular the absence of 
written decisions, also lack transparency.  This deficiency prevents the 
public from understanding why a Justice made a particular decision 
regarding recusal, which is inconsistent with the great pride that the 
institution usually exhibits in explaining to the public the reasons for its 
decisions.  This lack of transparency can harm the perceived integrity of 
such an important institution and undermine the public’s trust that it is 
operating in a non-partisan manner.  While not discussing recusals, a 
2009 speech by Justice Breyer addressing judicial independence supports 
the idea that the Supreme Court needs to do a better job of addressing 
the public’s perception that Justices are pursuing personal agendas.  This 
point applies with particular force to providing better information about 
recusal decisions.  Justice Breyer stated:   
A poll was conducted at the beginning of the decade 
that asked people whether they believed that judges 
decide cases impartially and according to law or 
whether they believe that judges do whatever they 
desire as soon as they don a judicial robe.  When that 
poll was initially conducted, two-thirds of the 
respondents believed that judges decided cases 
impartially and one-third thought that judges simply 
decided cases according to their own preferences.  When 
that same poll was conducted again five years later, 
however, close to half of the respondents indicated that 
judges’ votes are driven by their personal 
predilections. . . .  
 All of my colleagues and I . . . fulfill our judicial 
duties by attempting to decide cases in a manner that is 
consistent with what the law requires. 
                                                 
24 Lubet, supra note 1, at 893.  Lubet quotes journalist Tony Mauro who said that several 
Justices told him “that they don’t explain their reasons because they would not want to 
pressure their colleagues into recusing in a similar situation.”  Id. (citing to Tony Mauro, 
Justices in the Media, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2011, 11:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
community/justices-in-the-media/). 
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 But a serious discrepancy between our own view of 
our own efforts and the view of a large segment of the 
public is cause for concern in a democracy. . . . [T]he 
judiciary is, in at least some measure, dependent on the 
public’s fundamental acceptance of its legitimacy.25 
Consistent with the sentiments in Justice Breyer’s speech, perhaps 
the most important change that the Court could make regarding recusals 
would be to require a written opinion from any Justice to whom a 
motion for recusal is directed.26  This change would not necessarily 
require the adoption of a code of conduct.  It could simply be made part 
of the Supreme Court’s rules or internal policies.  Written decisions 
would serve two key functions.  First, they would develop a body of 
precedent that would help develop standards, and thus uniformity, 
among the Justices’ recusal decisions.  Second, written decisions would 
aid the public’s understanding of why a Justice chose to participate in a 
case under circumstances in which a party to the litigation questioned 
that Justice’s impartiality.  The public may disagree with a Justice’s 
decision, as many did with Justice Scalia’s decision not to recuse himself 
in Cheney v. District Court, despite his duck hunting trip with the vice 
president several weeks after the Supreme Court decided to hear the 
case.27  Understanding a Justice’s reasons, however, at least allows for 
public discourse about the matter, which is an important component of 
democracy.  The requirement for a written decision was contained in 
H.R. 862 and urged by over 100 law professors who wrote to the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees.28  It is a requirement that the Supreme 
Court should adopt. 
                                                 
25 Breyer, supra note 12. 
26 Court rules could limit motions to parties to the litigation so that other interested 
players, such as amici curie are not included.  This would limit the number of motions that 
would be filed, as parties to a suit pending before the Supreme Court are likely to be 
judicious in filing such motions. 
27 541 U.S. 913 (2004); see also Editorial, Recusals and the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/opinion/08fri1.html?_r=0 (stating that many 
disagreed with Justice Scalia’s decision not to recuse himself). 
28 H.R. 862, which was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 1, 2011, 
stated in part:   
If a justice of the Supreme Court denies a motion brought by a party to 
a proceeding before the Court that the justice should be disqualified 
from the proceeding under section 455 of such title, the justice shall 
disclose in the public record of the proceeding the reasons for the 
denial of the motion. 
H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2011).  The bill also required a Justice to disclose in the 
public record reasons for disqualification when a Justice decides to recuse him or herself.  
Id. § 3(a)(1). 
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III.  ACCOUNTABILITY 
A key aspect of Lubet’s proposal would be to have the remaining 
eight Justices review a Justice’s recusal decision.  Through this 
mechanism, if an individual Justice did not have the objectivity to 
accurately assess his or her impartiality, the remaining eight Justices 
would be able to review and overrule that decision.29  This proposal 
would provide a method of accountability in the cases, which may not be 
common, when a Justice does not accurately assess his or her own 
objectivity.  It could also increase the integrity of the institution by 
providing a means of review for these important decisions.30  It does, 
however, raise some concerns about whether the public would construe 
such a review process as a way for a group of Justices to exclude a Justice 
for the purpose of pursuing a perceived partisan agenda.  Lubet makes a 
good point that individuals are not necessarily the best arbiters of their 
own objectivity.31   
As a further point, § 455 does not require that a Justice actually be 
biased to warrant recusal.  It states that a Justice “shall disqualify himself 
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”32  The statute is somewhat vague in that it does not identify 
who would reasonably question the Justice’s impartiality.  In his annual 
report, Roberts states that the “objective standard focuses the recusal 
inquiry on the perspective of a reasonable person who is knowledgeable 
about the legal process and familiar with the relevant facts.”33  The other 
eight Justices are individuals who are knowledgeable about the legal 
process and familiar with the relevant facts,34 so their review would aid 
                                                 
29 Another proposal by Stephen Gillers would be to send recusal motions to the Justice 
involved and the Chief Justice.  If the Justice decided not to recuse, the Chief Justice would 
then act as a gatekeeper and decide if the motion warranted review by the full court.  
Editorial, A Way Forward on Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/opinion/a-way-forward-on-judicial-ethics.html. 
30 For example, Lubet describes how Justice Kagan set up her own screening process 
while she was at the Justice Department to shield herself from information about the 
government’s strategy in the health care litigation.  Then, as a Justice, she was the sole 
arbiter of whether her screening process was sufficient.  Lubet, supra note 1, at 891–93.  
Perhaps her assessment was correct, but the integrity of the process would benefit if her 
assessment was subject to an outside review, even if the outcome was the same. 
31 Lubet, supra note 1, at 897–98. 
32 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006); Bassett, supra note 17, at 674–76. 
33 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 7 (emphasis added). 
34 It is also not clear what the “relevant facts” are.  If they relate to the facts regarding the 
Justice’s potential bias, in the absence of a written decision by the Justice who is 
considering recusal, perhaps no one knows all of the potentially relevant facts other than 
that Justice. 
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assessing whether recusal is warranted in a particular case under the 
standard in § 455. 
Lubet addresses the concern about review of recusal decisions being 
used as a tool for outcome manipulation.35  In his report, Chief Justice 
Roberts stated that review by the full court “would create an undesirable 
situation in which the Court could affect the outcome of a case by 
selecting who among its Members may participate.”36  As Lubet 
explains, if a majority of the Court—meaning five out of eight Justices—
is needed to overrule the ninth Justice’s decision to sit, then those five 
Justices necessarily have a majority to control the outcome of the case 
regardless of whether or not the ninth Justice sits.37  There is no danger 
of outcome manipulation.  Roberts’s reasoning is unpersuasive on that 
point. 
That being said, there is still a concern that a full court review could 
create a public perception that the majority of Justices were acting in a 
partisan way to manipulate outcomes.  While Lubet’s explanation is 
perfectly logical, this might be too subtle a point for much of the public 
who may not be familiar enough with the workings of the Court to 
understand this reasoning.  Only one-third of Americans can name all 
three branches of government.38  In one survey, only 37 percent of 
Americans knew there were nine Justices on the Supreme Court.39  Only 
one in seven Americans can name the Chief Justice.40  A 2005 survey 
found that only 57 percent of Americans could name any Supreme Court 
Justice.41  If much of the public does not have a basic understanding of 
the Court, it may not understand that the majority does not need to 
exclude a Justice in order to control the outcome of a case.  Instead, they 
may cynically view review by the whole Court as partisan outcome 
                                                 
35 Lubet, supra note 1, at 896–98. 
36 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 9. 
37 Lubet, supra note 1, at 897. 
38 Scott Warren, Iris Chen & Eric Schwarz, The Threat to American Democracy that Romney 
and Obama Aren’t Talking About, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0716/The-threat-to-American-
democracy-that-Romney-and-Obama-aren-t-talking-about.  Former Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor has been advocating a return to stronger civics education in a web-
based project.  What Is iCivics?, ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/About (last visited Jan. 31, 
2013). 
39 Many Americans History, Civics-Challenged:  Poll, CBS NEWS (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500202_162-20045778.html. 
40 Francine Kiefer, Back to Basics by Getting Back to Civics Education, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (May 28, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-Board-
Blog/2010/0528/Back-to-basics-by-getting-back-to-civics-education?nav=522450-
csm_article-bottomRelated. 
41 Mark Hansen, Flunking Civics:  Why America’s Kids Know so Little, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 
2011), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/civics/. 
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manipulation if, for example, there are five conservative Justices who 
exclude a liberal Justice from sitting or vice versa.  This could harm the 
legitimacy of the institution.  As Justice Breyer stated in his speech on 
judicial independence:   
[A] serious discrepancy between our own view of our 
own efforts and the view of a large segment of the public 
is cause for concern in a democracy.  That is because the 
judicial system, in a sense, floats on a sea of public 
opinion. . . . [T]he judiciary is, in at least some measure, 
dependent on the public’s fundamental acceptance of its 
legitimacy.  And when a large segment of the population 
believes that judges are not deciding cases according to 
the rule of law, much is at stake.42 
H.R. 862 proposed a different approach whereby retired justices or 
judges of other federal courts would review recusal decisions.43  Whether 
Congress has the power to enact such a provision is questionable,44 but 
by having outsiders conduct the review, this approach would address 
concerns about an appearance of outcome manipulation by the Court.  
Perhaps there is a hybrid approach that would address the outcome 
manipulation perception problem but also keep the Court involved.  For 
example, if a Justice denied a motion to recuse, the Justice would provide 
a written decision.  If the party who made the motion was not satisfied 
with the Justice’s reasoning, the party could ask the full court to assess 
whether an outside review was warranted.  If a majority of the Court 
agreed that an outside review was warranted, then it would be referred 
to a body of other judges and/or retired justices for a dispositive ruling.  
If a majority of the Court did not find that an outside review was 
warranted, then the Justice’s decision would stand. 
In conclusion, Lubet’s article addresses many legitimate concerns 
about the Supreme Court’s current recusal practice and its impact on the 
integrity of the Court.  If the Court enacted a code of conduct, that could 
begin to address some of the concerns.  The issue of enforcement, 
however, would still need to be addressed.  Lubet’s proposal for a full 
Court review of recusal decisions could address that issue in the area of 
                                                 
42 Breyer, supra note 12. 
43 H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011). 
44 Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1225–26 (2011); see also John Gibeaut, Sitting This One out:  Health Care 
Case Again Raises Recusal Controversy, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/sitting_this_one_out_health_care_case_ag
ain_raises_recusal_controversy/. 
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recusals, but it does raise some concerns about how the public would 
perceive the process.  In my opinion, the most curative prescription 
would be for the Court to require written decisions from Justices for 
every recusal decision.  This would help develop uniform standards for 
recusal, which could have an indirect impact on accountability by 
guiding future recusal decisions.  It would also provide transparency so 
the public would have a better understanding of why Justices chose to sit 
in cases where there has been extensive public commentary on whether 
or not they were impartial enough to do so. 
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